interpretation is a sad legacy of people like Simms that should not be swept under the rug.
Similarly, Guilds has high praise for William Gilmore Simms's portrayal, in the Sack and Destruction of the City of Columbia, S.C. (1865) of the arrival of General William T. Sherman and his Unionist troops. Simms, who had fled to Columbia as a safe haven from his plantation and who compared Sherman's forces to Huns and Vandals, presented a vivid and potent-but extremely one-sided-picture of the Yankees, who, in addition to other depredations, supposedly prevented local firemen from putting out the fire that ravaged the city. This legend of the ruthlessness and indifference of the Yankees to human suffering played a powerful role in the origins and perpetuation of the "Lost Cause" mythology that united white southerners for generations to come in romanticizing the Old South and the Confederacy, especially its military leaders. This mythology provided the intellectual and moral basis for the racist and reactionary regimes that ruled the South for so many years after the Civil War.
Marion Brunson Lucas, in Sherman and the Burning of Columbia (1976), developed a much more balanced and multi-causal explanation of the events surrounding the burning of Columbia that repudiates the Yankees-blocking-the-firemen story and places Simms's other allegations in a broader context. Lucas's work had been widely accepted as the definitive study of this topic. Nevertheless, Guilds completely ignores Lucas's book and makes extravagant claims about Simms as a historian. According to Guilds, Simms's "presence in the city and credibility as a historian lend substance to his depiction" (31). Based on this line of thinking, Guilds concludes that Simms "is particularly valuable in his importance to both historians and literary scholars" (35).
It seems obvious that Guilds has fallen into a prevalent pitfall for scholars who spend many years working on one subject: batten down the hatches and defend your man against all comers Certainly two types of democracy-political and social-sit uncomfortably in separate chapters of the book, and probably sat as uncomfortably with many of the men. It's hard to find the same kind of rough affection for many of Polk's appointed officers as the men clearly had for the Whig generals, Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor, who were so often the target of Polk's suspicion and concern. It's also hard to understand from Winders's analysis why Franklin Pierce, alone among Polk's appointees, was able to transfer his wartime performance into a successful presidential bid. Much of the problem probably lies in Winders's sources, which stress the accounts of officers and the diaries of literate volunteers. It's hard to hear the inarticulate, but this book certainly shows us that such questions are rewarding to ask.
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